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A wareness has been growing in recent years that modem societies, in-creasingly computer-dependent, are highly vulnerable to malicious in-
trusion into their computers and computer networks. Concern about this issue 
is especially high in the United States; in all likelihood, no other country is more 
at risk. The reality of these concerns is underscored by news reports chronicling 
an active "cyberwar" that appears currendy to be underway. This is not, how-
ever, a conflict involving another State or even a terrorist group as the adversary. 
Instead, this struggle pits federal law enforcement officials against computer 
"hackers" who have defaced US Government Internet sites (including the web-
site of the National Infrastructure Protection Center) and have threatened the 
electronic destruction of Internet servers if the federal government continues 
the batde.1 
At the moment, the reality of such computer network attack (CNA) by pri-
vate individuals and non-State actors may be more pressing than the use ofCNA 
as an instrument of hostile action by one State against another. Whether CNA 
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actually has been used as an instrument of State action is uncertain as of this writ-
ing. According to numerous press reports, President Clinton approved a covert 
action against Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic that was intended to include 
computer network attacks against Milosevic's financial assets held outside Yu-
goslavia.2 It also has been reported that General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of 
the Joint ChiefS of Staff, acknowledged that the United States used CNA against 
Serbian computer networks in the course of the Kosova conflict and that the 
Defense Department is actively engaged in organizing for the coordination not 
only of defensive measures to protect military computer networks from 
"cyberterrorists," but of offensive CNA operations.3 However, unnamed "se-
nior defense officials" also have been quoted as saying that the United States re-
frained from implementing plans to use CNA against Serbian computer 
networks for purposes of disrupting military operations and basic civilian ser-
vices, due in part to legal guidance from the Defense Department's Office of 
General Counsel that certain uses of CNA could be considered as "war 
crimes."4 
Thus, it remains unclear whether the United States attempted to use CNA in 
connection with the Kosova conflict. There is no doubt, however, that the De-
partment of Defense has made an extensive study of the international legal issues 
that such use could engenderS and that US military and national security e:ll.-perts, 
looking to the possibility of using CNA in future conflicts, have an understandable 
interest in understanding the implications of CNA under international law. 
Such legal issues can arise under both the jus ad bellum and the jus iu bello. This 
discussion is confined to the former, specifically to the extent to which peace-
time use of CNA by or on behalf of a State (including use in the course of 
hostilities that do not attain the status of a war under international law) can be 
characterized as an exercise of "force" under Article 2(4) of the United Nations 
Charter.6 Because the discussion is limited to this threshold question, it will not 
extend into other areas, in particular, when CNA that constitutes force under 
Article 2(4) might also rise to the level of an "armed attack" under Article 51 of 
the Charter or might be lawfully used as a defense against such an attack'? 
At the outset, it may be useful to define the "rules of engagement" for this dis-
cussion. Reisman has pointed out that jurists' formulations, which characteristi-
cally take the form of "this is the law," often refer "simultaneously and \vithout 
discrimination to descriptions about flows of decisions in the past, predictions 
about the way decisions may be taken in the future, or statements of prefer-
ence."8 This criticism seems particularly applicable to statements about interna-
tionallaw. It thus is appropriate to make clear what kind of statements this chap-
ter is intended to make. 
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It is too early for any legal authority to have emerged on the status of CNA 
under Article 2(4). Consequendy, analysis of the question must proceed on the 
basis of analogy to such possibly relevant authority and doctrine as exists in other 
contexts. The statements about the law set forth in this chapter, therefore, do not 
purport to describe the flow of past decisions direcdy on point. Nor do they state 
a policy preference unless explicidy identified as such. Rather, they are predic-
tive of where it appears that existing legal doctrine, found in other contexts, rea-
sonably would carry a court seized with an issue concerning the status of 
peacetime CNA under Article 2(4). 
The conclusion to which such predictive analysis leads is that there is no 
"bright-line" rule. Instead, certain applications ofCNA are likely to be held to 
constitute force under Article 2(4), but many other applications are likely not to. 
This nebulous conclusion may disappoint the proponents of two positions that 
have emerged in scholarly and military circles. The first, focusing on the inher-
endy malicious and destructive nature of CNA, advocates that it should be con-
sidered to be a prohibited use of force under Article 2(4) and thus to violate 
intemationallaw, except when otherwise authorized under the Charter. The 
second, viewing CNA as having the beneficial potential to achieve military or 
political objectives ,vith less violence than traditional means of warfare, points in 
the opposite direction-CNA (except maybe in its most extreme applications) 
should not be viewed as a prohibited use of force, because to do so would pro-
mote the application of more lethal techniques. Approaching the question in a 
predictive mode, however, leads one to conclude that both these extremes are 
examples of ,vishful thinking, conflating a policy objective with a fair reading of 
the state of the law.9 
Preliminary Questions 
Before addressing the core question, several preliminary issues merit discus-
sion, namely the definition of CNA, the techniques that it encompasses, and, fi-
nally, whether there is any real prospect that the status of CNA under Article 
2(4) will be clarified without creating a new legal regime or clarifying instru-
ment for that purpose. 
The Definition of "Computer Network Attack" 
A threshold question is what is meant by "computer network attack." CNA 
has been defined inJoint ChiefS of Staff doctrine as "operations to disrupt, deny, 
degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, 
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or the computers and networks themselves. "10 For the sake of convenience, this 
definition will be adopted for present purposes. But it should be noted that it 
sweeps too broadly to be truly useful, because it includes a range of physical 
techniques of attack that could be directed at almost any target. 
Unless it be contended that computer facilities have a different status in inter-
national law than other facilities (a proposition for which there is no authority), 
targeting a kinetic weapon, such as a missile, bomb or other explosive device, at 
a computer (or, more likely, a structure known to house computing facilities) 
should not raise any different question under intemationallaw than if the same 
weapon were targeted at another piece of equipment or a structure used for a differ-
ent purpose. The operation itself almost certainly will be characterized as a use of 
force. 11 Thus, because it includes techniques of physical attack that are not unique to 
computers but instead are widely applicable without distinction as to target, the 
Joint ChiefS' definition of CNA has limited utility as a tool oflegal analysis. 
At the same time, the definition contains an ambiguity that also may limit its 
usefulness, in that it is unclear whether it encompasses the manipulation of a 
computer network to achieve an effect extrinsic to the network itself, as opposed 
to merely rendering the network ineffective. An example of such an extrinsic ef-
fect would be the hostile manipulation of a computerized railway control system 
as to produce train wrecks.12 Similar hypothetical examples abound, running 
from the potentially catastrophic13 to the merely vexatious. 14 While such oper-
ations could be viewed as a form of "degrading" the information resident in the 
computer, the definitional fit is awkward. Since these manipulative variants of 
CNA are, however, potentially among the most important from a force perspec-
tive, they will be assumed to be included within the definition for purposes of 
this discussion.1s 
Techniques of CNA 
How CNA is accomplished can have a bearing on the legal analysis. CNA is 
not a monolithic technique. On the contrary, there are many methods by which 
computer networks have been, or could be, attacked. Nor is CNA capable only 
of being directed at a single objective. Instead, a broad array of purposes can be 
served by hostile intrusion into computers or computer networks. These in-
clude, among others: (i) extracting the information held in the target computer 
(espionage); (ii) disseminating information through the adversary's information 
network in order to deceive the adversary or stimulate political instability; (iii) 
preparing the batdespace by incapacitating the adversary's command, control, 
and communication capabilities; or (iv) causing property damage, physical 
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injury, or death by manipulating infrastructure or operational systems controlled 
by the target computer. 
It should be obvious that which technique is being considered, as well as the 
purposes for which it is to be employed, can make a significant difference to the 
legal outcome. As noted above, a traditional physical attack (e.g., bombing the 
building that houses the computers) seems to present no legal issues specific to 
the fact that the target is a computer or computer network. The legally most in-
teresting applications of CNA are those methods of attack which are highly spe-
cific to computers because they make use of the methods by which computers 
themselves operate. 
Concern about infrastructure security and the potential vulnerability of the 
United States to malicious intrusion on computers and computer networks has 
generated considerable discussion of the non-kinetic technical means by which 
computers might be attacked.16 It is not necessary here to rehearse the technical 
details. It is sufficient to note their general outlines. What is unique to computers 
is their vulnerability to what has been called" digital data warfare" 17 namely the 
covert introduction of malicious computer code into a computer system or net-
work to achieve an objective. 
There is a rich lexicon describing variants of malicious computer code (e.g., 
"virus," "'worm," "Trojan horse," "flying Dutchman," "time bomb," "logic 
bomb"18), but the labels do not matter here. What is significant in the present 
context is that malicious computer code can be designed to lie dormant until 
triggered and to self-destruct and eliminate evidence of its presence after the 
mission has been accomplished. Also significant is that most computer systems 
are linked electronically to other systems and that malicious code usually can be 
introduced into a computer system by electronic data transfer (over the Internet 
or directly) as long as the attacker can evade or overwhelm whatever defenses are 
built into the system. Malicious code also can be introduced into a computer 
system by concealing it in hardware or software that the operator of the target 
system unwittingly incorporates into the system. There also reportedly are 
back-door techniques for introducing malicious code into computer systems 
\vithout any use of media for which the system was designed, for example by 
manipulating the power system or using high-energy radio frequencies or care-
fully controlled electromagnetic pulses.t9 
The Prospects that the Law will be Clarified 
Although the application of UN Charter Article 2(4) to CNAis anintellectu-
ally interesting question, there is reason to wonder whether, as a practical matter, 
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the issue ever will arise in a context requiring an actual decision. The most im-
portant obstacle may be the difficulty of attributing CNA to State action. More-
over, even if State use ofCNA were to emerge as a recognizable phenomenon, 
such CNA would have to occur in relative isolation in order squarely to pose the 
relevant legal issue. Because this seems improbable, it likely will be a long time, if 
ever, before the practice of States, decisions of the International Court ofJustice 
(IC]), or other recognized sources of international law yield a clarification of 
how Article 2(4) applies to CNA. Thus, the best prospect for a prompt and au-
thoritative elucidation of the status ofCNA under Article 2(4) would be if States 
were to agree to define the legal parameters ofCNA through an appropriate in-
ternational instrument. 
1. State action. Although various authors have posited a number of forms 
that an incident ofCNA could take, from disrupting air traffic control systems to 
"busting" dams or oil pipelines, the rub is that, at least up to the time of this writ-
ing and to the best of the author's knowledge, none of these imaginable instances 
of CNA actually has been perpetrated by a State or with publicly-discernible 
State sponsorship.2o Indeed, the more extreme (and therefore more interesting) 
examples apparendy have not occurred at all. 
It certainly is true that numerous instances of intrusion into computer net-
works by private individuals (generally called "hacking") have taken place re-
cendy.21 Some of these have been fairly primitive, such as the flooding of US 
Government Internet websites with messages ("spamming") emanating from 
Serbia and protesting US bombing of that country.22 Others have been more so-
phisticated and potentially quite hannful, including attacks on Defense Depart-
ment and other US Government computer networks. But most appear to have 
been the work of individuals or groups not identified (at least not in any source 
accessible to the public) as sponsored by a State. 
Lacking acknowledged, or at least provable, State action or State sponsorship, 
such events must be considered as raising problems in international criminality, 
not public international law. Moreover, to date there appears to have been no 
State reaction to CNA in the international legal arena. Because no State has yet 
taken any action or asserted a legal position vis-a.-vis another State arising out of 
an incident of CNA, there is a lack of the State practice that could illuminate the 
international legal analysis of CNA, whether under Article 2(4) or under cus-
tomary international law. 
This state of affairs is not surprising. CNA is a new phenomenon. Moreover, 
unlike many other putative techniques offorce, most forms ofCNA may be dif-
ficult or impossible to trace to the real perpetrator. Indeed, the most effective 
forms of CNA are likely to be contrived so as to conceal the fact that they 
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occurred at all, leaving the target State in doubt as to whether the affected com-
puter network was externally attacked or simply failed for other reasons. Obvi-
ously, to the extent that it is not possible plausibly to demonstrate the existence 
of an event of CNA, even less the identity of the perpetrator and a nexus to a 
State sufficient to imply State responsibility, any State response based on an al-
leged violation of Article 2(4), or indeed any other norm of international law, 
would lack credibility. 
This issue is exacerbated by the amorphous structure of the Internet. If an in-
cident of CNA is effected by "indirect penetration"23 over the Internet, it may 
be difficult to determine where it originated. There is no inherent reason why 
the point from which the attack is launched must be in the territory of the State 
that caused the act to be done. Moreover, even if the identity of the immediate 
perpetrator is discovered, it may be impossible to demonstrate a link between 
that person or organization and a State to which responsibility for the CNA can 
be attributed. To date, the mode of CNA in actual practice is the computer 
"hacker," wreaking havoc for sport or, occasionally, for some ideological mo-
tive. One would expect any State that chose to use CNA as a weapon to attempt 
to make its efforts look like those of a hacker. 
Moreover, the contexts in which a State is most likely to use CNA unaccom-
panied by an array of traditional military instruments are intelligence collection 
and covert action, for example, the use ofCNA to sow unrest in the target State's 
population. Such applications of CNA, however, probably are also the least 
likely to be publicly acknowledged by, or credibly attributable to, the State that 
perpetrates them. 
2. Unlikelihood ofIsolated Use. In order for the status ofCNA under Ar-
ticle 2(4) to emerge as an issue, the incident in question probably would have to 
be considered in isolation. If, as may have been the case in the Kosova conflict, 
CNA is used in the context of a military operation conducted by traditional 
means that indubitably constitute force, the target State would have litde interest 
in raising a legal dispute on the sole issue of CNA. (Thus, Serbia may have tena-
ble claims that the entire operation conducted against it was a violation of inter-
national law, but it is unlikely that it would single out US hacking into its 
computer networks, ifit occurred, as a separate violation, even less one worthy 
of an individualized response.) 
The Status of CNA Under Article 2(4) 
Lacking any direcdy applicable precedents or other sources of international 
law, the status of CNA under Article 2(4) only can be predicted by drawing 
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analogies to other phenomena whose status is better established. If CNA in all its 
manifestations easily could be assimilated to armed force, further discussion 
would be superfluous, since Article 2(4) indisputably encompasses armed force. 
Neither every form of CNA nor every purpose for which CNA can be used, 
however, readily can be analogized to armed force. Some applications ofCNA 
(including, notably, those the United States is reported to have contemplated 
using against Slobodan Milosevic) operate only in the economic or political 
sphere, thus making highly relevant the question whether Article 2(4) encom-
passes measures of economic or political coercion, or, if not all such measures, at 
least those that threaten the target State's territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence. Moreover, because it may be unclear (given the inherent problems of 
tracing CNA to its source) whether an incident ofCNA has been conducted by 
military forces, another relevant issue, if one is to reason by analogy, is whether 
non-military uses of physical force can fall within the scope of Article 2(4). 
Economic and Political Coercion as Force 
Virtually since the Charter was adopted, controversy has existed as to 
whether measures of economic and political coercion constitute force under Ar-
ticle 2(4). The weight of scholarly opinion supports the negative view,24 but that 
does not appear to have put the question to rest, at least as applied to CNA. Thus, 
one recent analysis ofCNA under Article 2(4), while admitting that the "pre-
vailing view" among scholars would confine Article 2(4) to "armed force," as-
serts that a more balanced, contextual view of Article 2(4) would conclude that 
economic and political sanctions can threaten international peace and a target 
State's territorial integrity and political independence and therefore can fall 
within the ambit of Article 2(4); the author's conclusion that CNA generally falls 
within Article 2(4) derives from this premise.25 In contrast, another recent anal-
ysis of the status ofCNA under Article 2(4) adopts the opposite conclusion, that 
"the prohibition of the threat or use of force includes armed, but not economic 
or political coercion. "26 The same author goes on to comment, however, that 
the borders offorce do not necessarily "precisely coincide with armed force, i.e., 
physical or kinetic force applied by conventional weaponry."27 
On balance, the latter perspective is better founded. Although a conclusion that 
economic or political coercion standing alone constitutes force under Article 2(4) 
might well contribute more to the purposes of the Charter and to the maintenance 
of world order than the contrary, that does not make it tenable as a matter oflegal 
analysis. A number of points sustain the view that Article 2(4) does not apply to 
measures of political or economic coercion. These include the following: 
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• The historical background of Article 2(4) shows that it was conceived 
against a background of international efforts to eliminate unilateral 
recourse to armed force.28 Measures of economic and political coercion 
were not the issue. 
• The travaux preparatoires of the Charter indicate that the San Francisco 
Conference declined to adopt a proposal that was advanced to extend the 
prohibition on the use offorce to include economic sanctions. Subsequent 
General Assembly declarations, principally the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations29 and the Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness 
of the Principle of Refraining from Threat or Use of Force in 
International Relations,3o provided an opportunity for the General 
Assembly to clarify the issue by delineating economic and political 
coercion as equivalents of armed force for purposes of Article 2(4). Efforts 
were made by some Members to this end, but they met resistance from 
other Members and were unsuccessful,31demonstrating that there is no 
common understanding among Members that would support extending 
Article 2(4) to economic or political coercion. 
• There is no decision of the International Court of Justice (IC]) holding 
that measures of economic or political coercion constitute force under 
Article 2(4). Indeed in the Nicaragua case,32 in which the Court generally 
considered the customary international law prohibition against the use of 
force to be coterminous with Article 2(4) (which was not itself at issue), 
Nicaragua complained of substantial measures of economic pressure. 
These were considered to be violations of the bilateral treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Nicaragua and the 
United States, however, and were not even mentioned as possible 
violations of the customary international law prohibition on the use of 
force. Moreover, the Court held that even the United States' furnishing of 
substantial financial support to insurgent forces in Nicaragua, support that 
was used to sustain acts of violence, did not constitute the use of force 
under customary international law.33 It would seem, if financing an 
armed insurrection is not force, that, a fortiori, other economic measures 
that have a less direct nexus to armed violence would not be either. 
Thus, despite arguments advanced to the contrary, the fact remains that the 
drafting history of the Charter is inconsistent with such an extension, that this 
question generally has divided Western States from significant components of 
the "Third W orId," and that no international consensus has emerged defining 
economic and political coercion, standing alone, as force, although there is a 
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strong basis for concluding that such forms of coercion may violate other norms 
ofinternationallaw, such as the principle of non-intervention.34 
An argument can be made that the prevailing view regarding economic and 
political measures of coercion should not apply to CNA. Although ultimately 
not convincing, it proceeds along the following lines. In more than half a cen-
tury of debate over the application of Article 2(4) to economic and political co-
ercion, the kind of coercion that has been envisaged has been primarily external 
and gradual-trade sanctions, withholding economic benefits, unequal trading 
practices, interference with the target State's external commercial relations. In 
contrast, the kind of economic coercion that CNA might make possible, crip-
pling the banking system, or shutting down the securities markets, operates on 
the internal economic structures of the target State and does so through a swift 
and devastating blow. Therefore, since CNA is a different phenomenon, it can 
be argued that the earlier debate over economic and political sanctions as force is 
irrelevant. 
While the factual premise underlying this argument may be valid, all it dem-
onstrates is the neutral fact that CNA is a new form of hostile activity. That 
CNA may differ from earlier forms of economic and political coercion does 
not tell us whether CNA comes within the intended scope of Article 2(4) or 
instead should be viewed as another manifestation of the types of economic 
and political coercion that various states have failed to persuade the interna-
tional community to acknowledge as falling within the definition of "force. " 
In analyzing the application of Article 2(4) to CNA in order to predict how 
the ICJ and the world community will view CNA, it seems prudent, in light of 
existing legal authority, to acknowledge, however much a different conclusion 
might be desired on policy grounds, that there is little likelihood that purely eco-
nomic or political coercion, even if effectuated in novel ways, will be considered 
to violate Article 2(4). If this proposition is correct, it suggests that the touch-
stone in any future analysis ofCNA under Article 2(4) will be whether the spe-
cific application ofCNA at issue more closely resembles economic and political 
coercion, on the one hand, or, on the other hand, military force as the latter con-
cept is commonly understood. 
Non~Military Physical Force 
Another interpretive issue under Article 2(4) that bears on the status ofCNA 
is whether non-military physical measures can also constitute force for purposes 
of Article 2(4). Examples of such measures would include: a State intentionally 
acts to cause flooding in an adjacent down river State; a State sets a forest fire in a 
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frontier region intending that it spread into the target State; a State releases nox-
ious substances into the environment, knowing that the effect will be felt in the 
target State. Opinion is divided as to the status of such acts under Article 2(4) and 
there is no decisional authority direcdy on point. Some scholars admit the possi-
bility that in certain circumstances a hostile use of such non-military forms of 
physical force could fall within Article 2(4), especially if the results rose to a level 
of magnitude that could be viewed as the equivalent of an armed attack trigger-
ing the right of self-defense under Article 51.35 
The better view would appear to be that non-military physical force can in-
deed fall \vithin Article 2(4), even if the consequences do not rise to the level of 
an armed attack. The principal reason why scholars have opposed such an exten-
sion of Article 2(4) appears to be a "slippery slope" fear that applying Article 2(4) 
to non-military physical force when its effects approximate those of military 
force would open the door to applying Article 2(4) to measures of economic and 
political coercion that have similarly devastating effects. This fear is misplaced. 
In the case of non-military physical force, the fact that the force is physical is 
enough, first, to distinguish it from coercive economic and political measures 
and, second, to support an analogy to those military forms of physical force that 
clearly lie at the core of Article 2(4). 
If one is prepared to admit that non-military physical measures can constitute 
force for purposes of Article 2(4), it is hard to see why this should be the case only 
if the consequences are of a type and degree of seriousness that would rise to the 
level of an armed attack. It is widely recognized that not all force under Article 
2(4) necessarily constitutes an armed attack under Article 51. The ICJ implicidy 
so stated when it indicated in the Nicaragua case that supplying arms and other 
support to armed rebel bands in another State is not an armed attack but could 
constitute a violation of the customary international prohibition on the use of 
force.36 To require non-military force to rise to the level of an armed attack in 
order to violate Article 2(4) would obliterate the important distinction between 
Articles 2(4) and 51. Such a position would either legalize under Article 2(4) a 
broad range of hostile and destructive physical acts that fail to reach the armed 
attack threshold or would provide an incentive to lower the Article 51 thresh-
old, with a concurrent risk of expanding violence under the pretext oflegitimate 
self-defense. Thus, on balance, it seems better to conclude (although admit-
tedly without the benefit of any supporting authority) that intentional, hostile 
uses of non-military physical force by one State against another can fall within 
the scope of Article 2(4) when they sufficiendy resemble military force in their 
physically destructive effect, whether or not the criteria of an armed attack 
are met. 
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Flexibility of the Concept of Military Force 
Even if one were to accept the restrictive view that force under Article 2(4) 
means military force, it should be noted that the latter concept carries a large 
measure of :flexibility. As the techniques of warfare evolve, so too does the gen-
eral understanding of what constitutes "military" force. If this were not so, the 
prohibition of Article 2(4) would become ossified at the level of military tech-
nology that existed at the end ofW orld War II and would become increasingly 
irrelevant to the modem world. Thus, we have no difficulty in recognizing that 
new forms of biological and chemical warfare, directed energy, lasers, and other 
innovative technologies, if used intentionally by a State to cause physical injury 
or property damage in another State, will constitute forms of military or armed 
force. This applies even when the instrument itself, like a laser beam, is not in-
herently harmful but also is used for a range of beneficent purposes. 
'the hard question is how one recognizes when a new technology has be-
come a form of military or armed force. The answer is not always obvious, but 
one significant criterion is whether the technique is associated \vith the armed 
forces of the State that uses it. Thus, in the case ofCNA, if this technique were to 
be deployed only by intelligence agencies in conducting covert actions, it seems 
less likely that it would be generally accepted as a form of military or armed force 
than ifit were used by the armed forces. Consequently, it is likely that the fact 
that the US Department of Defense (apparently joined by the military forces of 
other countries) is making preparations for the military use ofCNA will hasten 
the day when a State's offensive use of CNA, at least for purposes of causing 
physical injury or property damage, will be considered a use offorce under Arti-
cle 2(4). 
Preliminary Conclusions 
Against the background of the foregoing discussion, what preliminary con-
clusions can be reached about the application of Article 2(4) to CNA? The basic 
conclusion appears to be that force is like pornography: the law will recognize 
certain forms of CNA as force when it sees them. The present state oflega! de-
velopment does not permit laying down any hard and fast rules as to when that 
will be. It does, however, permit one to make some predictions about the cir-
cumstances in which State use of CNA may be likely to be held to constitute 
force under Article 2(4). 
• CNA is not a single form of activity, nor is it potentially capable only of 
being directed at a single purpose. Thus there is no basis for concluding 
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that all fonns of CNA per se constitute a violation of Article 2(4). 
Consequendy, whether and when CNA will fall within the force category 
must be determined on a case-by-case basis. The question is how. 
• CNA is most like traditional military force, and thus most likely to 
constitute force under Article 2(4), ifits direct and foreseeable effects are 
physical injury or property damage. 
• CNA that direcdy and foreseeably produces physical injury or property 
damage similar to that resulting from the use of traditional forms of 
weaponry is likely to be viewed as a use of force under Article 2(4), 
especially if that CNA is carried out by a State's armed forces. 
• CNA that produces effects (even if direct and foreseeable) that are only of 
an economic or political nature is not likely to be held to be within the 
scope of Article 2(4). (Thus a program ofCNA that crippled the financial 
infrastructure of a target State would not be a use of force under Article 
2(4). Even if angry investors rioted and tore down the stock exchange, 
that physical damage would not be direct and foreseeable.) 
The notion that CNA will be recognized as force under Article 2(4) when it 
sufficiendy resembles military force implies that views on particular fonns of 
CNA are likely to evolve in light of developments in military operations. These 
may lead to surprising conclusions. For example, before NATO's campaign 
against Serbia, one might have predicted that using CNA to produce transitory 
power outages in a target State would not be recognizable as an analog or equiv-
alent of military force, because it causes no permanent damage to the targeted 
power system, and the effects on users of power, including the military, are un-
certain, indirect and incalculable. Transitory outages seem more of an economic 
measure or a psychological weapon (intended, if one may put it this way, to in-
duce a sense of powerlessness in the target State's population and leadership) 
than a military one. 
In the last year, however, it was reported that the United States, on behalf of 
NATO, employed an innovative form of weapon against Serbia, a type of carbon 
filaments used against electric power facilities.37 The filaments were dropped from 
aircraft, like a bomb, with the intention of causing property damage. Thus, it 
seems incontrovertible that their use was a form of armed force, even though the 
attacks did litde or no permanent damage, merely shorting out the power system 
and disabling it for a brief period, thereby producing some disruption to the econ-
omy and the military effort, but having principally a psychological effect. 
The same kinds of effects on the power system could be produced by CNA. 
Should this ever occur, it is likely that the earlier military use of the analogous 
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weapon described above will color the way the world looks at such use of CNA to 
shut down a target State's power system through manipulating its computerized 
controls. The existence of a military, non-CNA precedent, it is submitted, will cre-
ate a predisposition to try to fit such an incident ofCNA into the force category. 
The Views of Other Commentators 
A small number of commentators have addressed the status of CNA under 
Article 2(4) and have come to widely divergent conclusions. A few assert that 
CNA causing destructive effects is ipso facto a use of "force. " Others espouse the 
view advanced in this chapter, that CNA will only constitute force under Article 
2(4) if it sufficiently resembles what the world recognizes as armed or military 
force and focus on attempting to provide a more precise way of identifying the 
principles that underlie such recognition. 
1. Destructive effect as the touchstone. In one of the most extensive ex-
aminations of this issue to date, Sharp has proposed a rule that appears both 
sweeping and simple: "Any computer network attack that intentionally causes 
any destructive effect within the sovereign territory of another state is an unlaw-
ful use offorce within the meaning of Article 2(4) that may produce the effects of 
an armed attack prompting the right of self-defense. "38 
It should be noted that this rule is not without its own interpretive issues. 
Does the term "destructive" mean only physical destruction, for example, or 
does it include economic harm? Sharp suggests that it could include the latter in 
some circumstances. He concludes that Article 2(4), while not including all co-
ercive economic and political sanctions that are intended to influence another 
State's policy or actions, does extend to coercive political and economic sanc-
tions that threaten the territorial integrity or independence of another State.39 
Thus, a non-physical destructive effect (such as disruption of financial markets) 
should be considered force under Article 2(4) if it is sufficiently serious to 
threaten the target State's territorial integrity or independence. 
Aside from the fact that this conclusion is inconsistent with the weight oflegal 
authority, extending the concept of" destruction" to include coercive economic 
and political measures, but only if they threaten another State's territorial integ-
rity or independence, seems likely to deprive the posited rule of much ofits ap-
parent objectivity and simplicity, because it is not easy to determine when 
economic and political measures are likely to have such an effect unless the judg-
ment is being made after the effect already has been produced. 
For example, the Arab boycott ofIsrael manifestly was intended to threaten 
that country's territorial integrity and independence; it was carried out by States 
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that had declared war on Israel and espoused as their war aim the total elimina-
tion of the target country. Did that set of economic measures, or the associated 
political measures intended to delegitimize Israel in the international arena, re-
ally "threaten" Israel's territorial integrity and independence? With the benefit 
of hindsight, the answer clearly seems negative, but at different points in time the 
outcome was not so clear. Would we therefore conclude that the Arab boycott 
was a violation of Article 2(4) at certain periods in Israel's history and not at oth-
ers? Such a result seems an unworkable rule oflaw. The example illustrates the 
difficulty, except perhaps in the most extreme cases, of applying a rule that de-
pends on determining when a threat exists to territorial integrity or political 
independence. 
In advancing the "destructive effect" standard, Sharp reasons on the basis 
of the proposition that other forms of non-military physical force constitute 
force under Article 2(4),40 citing as examples the release of floodwaters or the 
spreading offire across a border.41 The argument then proceeds to adumbrate 
types of significant property damage, as well as possible human fatalities, that 
could be effected through CNA, such as flooding, train wrecks, plane crashes, 
chemical e}..l'losions, and fires. If these physically destructive events would con-
stitute force under Article 2(4) if produced by a State agency using non-military 
means, it is argued, why should they not also be considered force when pro-
duced by CNA? 
Although the underlying premise does not seem to be supported by judicial 
decision or State practice, the conclusion nonetheless is reasonable and should 
be widely accepted if confined to the examples given above. The analysis be-
comes markedly less compelling, however, when this already untested proposi-
tion is used as a springboard to make a leap into the arena of the financial, 
political, or psychological. The analogy to flood or fire is not convincing as a basis 
for concluding that causing "a run on banks or a massive financial crisis by crash-
ing national stock exchanges"42 also would constitute force. It pushes the under-
lying principle too far. (It should be noted that this assessment is not intended as a 
value judgment. Such State intervention in the affairs of another ought to be 
prohibited by international law and, indeed, may well may be on other grounds, 
such as the principle of non-intervention. The sole question, here, is whether 
Article 2(4) provides the norm.) 
There might well be narrow circumstances in which Article 2(4) could be 
held applicable to an attack having effects solely or primarily in the economic or 
political sphere, but, if so, it is submitted, this would be because of the means em-
ployed, not the nature of the target. For example, if a State were to use physical 
but non-military means to achieve these results (e.g., dispatching intelligence 
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operatives into the target State to cut a fiber-optic cable on which essential fi-
nancial information is transmitted), scholars might well conclude that an inci-
dent of force had occurred. Suppose instead, however, that a State sought to 
achieve the same end, financial disruption in the target State, through purely 
non-physical means, such as large-scale falsification of trading orders or dissemi-
nation offalse market information. These seem to be quintessential measures of 
economic coercion, and it is very unlikely that scholarly opinion would sustain 
the view that such acts constituted force under Article 2(4). Thus, identity of 
ultimate effects, standing alone, simply does not supply a sufficient basis for con-
cluding that Article 2(4) applies. The reason why the act of sabotage might be 
held to constitute force is not the end result (that the stock exchange crashes), 
but cutting the cable would involve an intrusion on the target State's territory 
that, although arguably "non-military," would achieve a physical effect closely 
resembling the use of kinetic action. 
2. Characteristics of anned force as the touchstone. In a recent analysis, 
Schmitt, recognizing that within the existing framework of international law, 
CNA will be deemed to be Article 2(4) force only when it sufficiently resembles 
armed force, embarks on an impressive effort to delineate a principled basis for 
identifying those cases of CNA that meet this test. 
He notes that traditional notions of force are instrument-based: the Article 
2(4) prohibition against using a particular instrument, namely military force, 
against another State is tied to the high degree of congruence between its use and 
reprobated consequences, primarily physical destruction and injury. This, it is 
posited, explains why armed force, which almost always results in physical de-
struction or injury, is prohibited force, while economic or political coercion, 
whose tie to predictable physical destruction or injury is tenuous, is not.43 
This observation is not entirely satisfying, however, because, as Schmitt has 
recognized, "the instruments do not precisely track the threats to shared values 
which, ideally, the international community would seek to deter."44 It is clear 
that many technologies that would be recognized as weapons when used for the 
purpose of causing physical damage or personal injury, e.g., laser beams, can be 
entirely beneficent in other uses, such as medicine. Thus, when we assign one of 
those technologies to the "armed force" category, it is not because of its inherent 
lethality but because of the potential destructiveness of the way it is being used or 
the purpose for which it is deployed. The same could be said of CNA. And, for 
this reason, it seems unlikely that many would debate that CNA used directly to 
cause physical destruction or injury (busting a dam, rupturing a pipeline, causing 
airplanes or trains to crash) is tantamount to~ a weapon for purposes of Article 
2(4), making its use force. The question is whether, applying criteria that will be 
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recognized as consistent with the current understanding of Article 2(4), any 
other use of CNA is sufficiendy similar to these easy cases to be placed confi-
dendy in the force category. 
To answer this question, Schmitt has suggested that, unless the interna-
tional community is prepared to adopt a new normative structure to apply to 
inter-State coercion, the analysis of CNA must be fit into the traditional 
instrument/ consequence based frame of reference by looking to see whether 
particular uses of CNA meet the criteria that distinguish armed force from poli-
tical or economic coercion.45 These criteria, he suggests, are: severity-the 
higher threat of physical injury or property damage associated with armed force; 
immediacy-the comparative swiftness of harm arising from armed force, as com-
pared with other forms of coercion; directness-the relatively direct connection 
between armed force and negative consequences, as compared with other forms 
of coercion; invasiveness-the fact that in the case of armed force the act causing 
harm generally crosses into the territory of the target State whereas measures of 
economic or political coercion normally do not; measurability-the greater 
ease and certainty of assessing the consequences of armed force as compared with 
other forms of coercion; and presumptive legitimacy-the fact that violence is 
presumptively illegal under domestic and international law, whereas most (or 
at least many) techniques of economic and political coercion are presump-
tively legal.46 
It would be desirable to be able to delineate criteria for identifying those types 
of CNA that should be treated as analogous to armed force. Yet, it is not clear 
that Schmitt's proposed six criteria reliably serve this purpose. Rather, examina-
tion of the criteria suggests that virtually any event ofCNA can be argued to fall 
on the armed force side of the line, except perhaps as regards the criterion of se-
verity, and that the criterion of severity in effect is just another way of articulat-
ing the observation that, for an event of CNA to be considered a type of force 
under Article 2(4), it must produce (or atleast threaten to produce) personal in-
jury or property damage similar to that caused by military weapons. Review of 
the proposed criteria, it is submitted, substantiates this proposition. 
Immediacy: CNA ordinarily occurs with great immediacy, once its destructive 
potential is triggered. While malicious software may be designed to lie dormant 
for an extended period until some triggering event occurs, once it becomes ac-
tive, the disruption of the targeted computer or computer network can be ex-
pected to be immediate, as well as immediately perceptible in result, even if the 
owner of the computer does not recognize that CNA is the cause of its degrada-
tion or destruction. (It is hard to imagine circumstances in which a slow, imper-
ceptible deterioration of the targeted computer would be advantageous to the 
89 
Computer Network Attack as a Use of Force under Article 2 (4) 
author of the attack.) Thus, there seems to be little difference between CNA and 
ordinary anned force, 
Directness: Compared to economic or political coercion, many applications of 
CNA are as direct as traditional armed force. The consequences generally flow 
directly from the act of attack itself and do not depend on intervening or con-
tributory factors in order to have a harmful effect. Directness might become an 
issue if the only harmful effect were property damage and any effect on human 
beings was reactive. Thus, there could be a significant difference between CNA 
that caused a dam's floodgates to open and kill people, and CNA that merely in-
convenienced the target population (e.g., by disrupting financial markets) to 
such a degree that rioting ensued. On the other hand, the path even from the lat-
ter form ofCNA to the reprobated result of physical injury and tangible property 
damage is no more (or less) indirect than similar consequences, such as starvation 
or health disasters, arising from a military blockade. Yet a military blockade is 
undeniably a use offorce. To the extent that the directness criterion is useful, it 
really seems to do no more than restate the proposition that to constitute force an 
event of CNA must directly cause physical injury or property damage and not 
operate solely in the economic or political realm. 
Invasiveness: At least at the level of electrons, the act causing the harm in a 
CNA attack usually crosses into the target State, whether it be by importation of 
a corrupted item of hardware or software, the actions of an agent of the hostile 
State (a cyber saboteur), or cross-border data transmission over the telephone 
network. There appears to be no difference, in this regard, between CNA and 
traditional armed force. 
Measurability: There seems no reason to assume that the consequences of an 
event of CNA would be any harder to measure than the negative consequences 
of armed coercion. 
Presumptive legitimacy: Many States already have enacted laws outlawing CNA 
when perpetrated by private parties within the territory. As more and more 
States become aware of the threat, it is likely that this technique, at least when 
used by non-State actors, will be viewed in most States as presumptively ille-
gal,47 thus eliminating any distinction between CNA and what traditionally has 
been regarded as armed force. 
Factoring out those of the criteria that do not appear reliably to distinguish 
CNA from armed coercion, all that is left is severity. Moreover, severity, as de-
fined for this purpose, seems applicable only to physical injury and property 
damage, compelling the conclusion that CNA will be considered within the 
force category only if its foreseeable consequence is to cause physical injury or 
property damage and, even then, only if the severity of those foreseeable 
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consequences resembles the consequences that are associated with armed coer-
cion. In short, what seems at first blush to be a nuanced way of analyzing inci-
dents of CNA in practice may in fact tum out to do no more than identify the 
cases that would be clear without applying a criterion any more formal than was 
suggested in the preliminary conclusions above: CNA will be considered as 
force when it causes physical i~ury or property damage that is recognizably sim-
ilar to that produced by instruments generally identified as weapons. 
The limitations of the proposed factors are demonstrated by Schmitt's own 
comparison of two hypothetical uses of CNA. 48 In the first, CNA is used to dis-
able an air traffic control system, causing airplanes to crash. According to 
Schmitt, this meets the criteria and is force. In the second example, the attacker 
destroys a university computer network for purposes of disrupting military re-
search being conducted on campus. This does not meet the test and is not force. 
Schmitt suggests that there should be a different result in the attack on the uni-
versity because the desired outcome, diminished capacity on the batdefield, is 
too remote from the event ofCNA and too dependent on indeterminate factors. 
But this is not persuasive; the question of remoteness depends on how the out-
come is defined. The immediate objective of the hypothetical CNA is to de-
grade the functioning of the targeted computer network, and the nexus between 
the act and that outcome is immediate. (One could as well argue that dropping 
filaments on Serbian electric power facilities to produce temporary power out-
ages is remote from the ultimate objective, impairing Serbia's ability to maintain 
military operations. Yet few would gainsay that the NATO bombing raids in 
which these devices were dropped constituted force under Article 2(4).) Thus, 
except for this purported difference in directness, Schmitt's two examples are re-
markably similar ,vith respect to the proposed factors. In reality, it is submitted, 
the only tenable reason, and the real underlying explanation, for the difference 
in the posited outcome is that in the first case there is physical i~ury and signifi-
cant property damage and in the second there is not. 
That severity does not reliably predict the legal outcome unless it is confined 
to the severity of physical injury and/or property damage is shown by consider-
ing another hypothetical use of CNA, disruption of the target State's financial 
system through interference with the computers through which securities are 
traded, money moves, and financial transactions are recorded and setded. If suc-
cessfully used against the United States or many other Western countries, the re-
sulting social and economic disruption and monetary losses would be staggering. 
For each of Schmitt's factors, this event ofCNA seems comparable to disabling 
an air traffic control system, except for the fact that it does not direcdy and 
foreseeably result in physical injury or property damage. In terms of severity, 
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more broadly construed, can there be any doubt that the impact of such an attack 
would be orders of magnitude more serious than if a hostile State, through a mis-
sile attack that caused no loss of life, obliterated a military warehouse full of uni-
forms--an incident that no one would hesitate to describe as within the scope of 
Article 2(4)? Yet, applying the existing legal framework for analyzing Article 2(4), 
this hypothetical attack on the country's financial infrastructure probably would 
be considered to fall outside the Article 2(4) force category, because it much more 
closely resembles economic coercion than traditional armed force. 
Conclusion: The Unsatisfactory Reality 
There is no legal authority directly applicable to the status of CNA under Ar-
ticle 2(4). The most significant interpretive issue under Article 2(4) that might 
support extending it to a broad range of types ofCNA is whether force includes 
economic or political coercion, and the weight of prevailing opinion is that it 
does not. Against this background, two approaches recently have been suggested 
in the literature. The first, destructiveness as the criterion, is relatively simple to 
apply (or could be made so with a few clarifications) and might be an appealing 
rule in a legislative context. The problem is that it is not founded in sufficient le-
gal authority to engender confidence as a correct predictive statement of inter-
national law under Article 2(4). The second recognizes the limitations imposed 
by prevailing interpretations of Article 2(4) and tries to remain faithful to them, 
while positing criteria by which one can recognize those uses ofCNA that fall in 
the force category. The exercise turns out to be somewhat illusory, however. At 
bottom, it leads to a conclusion that probably can be reached by reference to 
only one criterion: whether the foreseeable consequence of a particular manifes-
tation ofCNA is physical injury or property damage comparable to that resulting 
from military weapons. If so, the CNA will be held to fall within the force cate-
gory. Otherwise it will not.49 
What we are left with, it is submitted, is a situation in which general agree-
ment probably can be reached on the proposition that there are some kinds of 
CNA that so resemble armed force that, like other manifestations of 
non-military physical force that have been suggested as falling within Article 
2(4) (e.g., diverting a river in the hostile State so as to cause flooding in the target 
State), they will be held to fall within the scope of Article 2(4). It is likely that 
these forms ofCNA will be recognized widely as Article 2(4) force if and when 
they occur, but it is difficult to articulate the precise bases on which recognition 
will rest. The one basis that seems most reliable is that physical injury or property 
damage must arise as a direct and foreseeable consequence of the CNA and must 
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resemble the injury or damage associated with what, at the time, are generally 
recognized as military weapons. 
This conclusion appears highly unsatisfactory, leaving the law in a state of un-
certainty, but does it really matter that much? First, it is clear that, whether or 
not they violate Article 2(4), most significant uses ofCNA probably will violate 
other rules of international law, such as the prohibition against intervention in 
the affairs of other States, which the IC] has held to be a principle of customary 
international law. 50 Various specific techniques used in carrying out CNA are 
likely to violate other international treaties, such as those relating to telecom-
munications. Thus, responsible decision-makers concerned about determin-
ing the legality of proposed uses of CNA are not bereft oflegal principles to 
guide them. 
Second, at least from the target State's perspective, the key issue is whether an 
incident of CNA gives rise to a right to take counteraction in self-defense. For 
that right to arise under the Charter, there must be an armed attack within the 
meaning of Article 51, a standard that goes beyond the existence offorce under 
Article 2(4). It is difficult to say whether an event ofCNA that caused significant 
physical injury and/or property damage, standing alone, ever could be consid-
ered an armed attack. In all likelihood, however, a State's use of CNA of such 
magnitude would not occur in isolation; instead it probably would form part of a 
coordinated offensive, other elements of which undeniably would constitute 
armed attack. In such a context, the legal status of the CNA element in isolation 
probably would be of little importance. 
Third, worrying about the status of CNA under Article 2(4) may be fiddling 
while Rome burns. The notion that the Charter represents the sole legal struc-
ture under which coercive force can be exerted by one State against another 
largely has been discredited-both by the failure of the Security Council mecha-
nism to function as envisioned by the Charter's framers and by the practice of 
States in ignoring recourse to the Security Council in favor of unilateral (includ-
ing alliance-based) interventionism. The recent NATO humanitarian interven-
tion in Serbia, which was given the fig leaf of a Security Council resolution only 
after its military aims were achieved, may be a step on the road to a better and 
more moral system of international law, butit was only the most recent in a series 
of events that, over the decades, have dealt a heavy blow to the system suppos-
edly established by the Charter. 51 These events sustain the view that, while Arti-
cle 2(4) represents an aspiration, (perhaps, like another form of prohibition, a 
failed "noble eJo..-periment"), the reality of international law on the use of force 
lies in the development of a "nuanced code for appraising the lawfulness ofindi-
vidual unilateral uses offorce"52 that is different from Article 2(4). If so, it can be 
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eAl'ected that over time a set of understandings as to the lawfulness of CNA will 
evolve outside the Charter framework. 
This patient approach will not satisfY many, especially those who view CNA as a 
dangerous phenomenon. Enormous benefits to humankind, both actual and poten-
tial, derive from the use of computers. Advanced societies are moving towards 
pervasive dependence on the interplay of computer networks and advanced 
communications technologies. While not all consequences necessarily are wel-
come Ooss of privacy, for example, is a significant concern), technologically 
sophisticated countries like the United States are experiencing enormous bene-
fits in terms of increased productivity and enhancement of many aspects of the 
quality oflife. These are benefits to which the rest of the world appears to aspire. 
Yet technological sophistication engenders a degree of vulnerability that 
would have been unimaginable in earlier generations. (Who would have imag-
ined a few decades ago that significant numbers of people would fear the end of a 
millennium not for religious reasons but because of a computer programming is-
sue?) Human well-being throughout the world increasingly will depend on the 
inviolability of computer networks and the communications links that connect 
them. The world, it can be argued, should not have to rely for protection on un-
clear and debatable interpretations of the Charter or on principles of customary 
international law, such as non-intervention, that are honored in the breach and 
carry no ready enforcement mechanism. Nor should civilian populations be ex-
posed to the risk that a code of rules on the use of CNA will evolve only after 
devastating examples of its use have pointed the way. 
Thus, it is suggested (and this is an explicit expression of a policy preference, 
not a statement about the law as it is), efforts should be made towards the adop-
tion of an international convention that would bind the parties not to use CNA 
for any military or hostile use. This should be accompanied by enhanced efforts, 
whether in the context of the same convention or separately, to achieve global 
legal cooperation in fighting CNA perpetrated by non-State actors, by making 
such action criminal under domestic laws regardless of purported justification, 
and by allowing prosecution of the perpetrators wherever apprehended or their 
extradition to the country in which the target computer or computer network 
was located. 
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